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From Sherriff to Judge:
Re-imagining R2P as a Part of a New Constitutional Order
Introduction
In the old west, the sheriff was a figure that both made judgments and executed punishments. 
His image in popular culture (or, more accurately, American political culture) was of a lonely 
hero standing up to criminals without the backing of a fully defined legal order.1 The ‘white 
hat’ worn by the sheriff denotes his obvious goodness, a goodness defined in moral rather 
than legal terms, as he sometimes needed to act ‘outside the law’ in order to accomplish  his 
objective of defeating the ‘bad guys’. International relations has long had self-appointed 
sheriffs who see themselves standing before the onslaught of evil and impatient with the 
procedural delays that come with formal legal methods.2 When emergency situations arise – 
either terrorists or war criminals – someone ostensibly needs to act to stop them. 
But there are two central problems with the sheriff. First, while his role is legally 
authorized, the sheriff’s selection of which criminals to pursue and what punishment to inflict 
is purely discretionary. As a result, law enforcement reflects his personal and professional 
interests.  Second, when he does decide to enforce the law, he conflates in one person the 
three different functions of law in a political order: legislation, judgment and enforcement. 
While he might have the legal ‘right’ in one sense - or might see himself as being morally 
right - to take the actions he does, in so doing he will increase his own power at the expense 
of other agents in the community. 
A sheriff differs from a vigilante, though, in that the former is an official authorized 
by the state while the latter is an individual acting purely in his or her own interests. The 
vigilante may be acting in accordance with a shared normative sensibility about who deserves 
punishment, but that is not an officially sanctioned role. The sheriff, however, is officially 
sanctioned and may act in conformity with shared normative and legal principles. At the 
same time, the sheriff consolidates his power with each enforcement action and remains 
outside of any institutional check or judicial review in his decision on how to enforce or what 
to enforce when it comes to transgressions of the law.3 Thus, a sheriff’s actions may be legal 
in the formal sense but they remain disconnected from justice and, as a result, may become 
illegitimate. 
Our contention here is that humanitarian intervention in the current international order 
is being framed in such a way that it enables sheriffs rather than strengthening judges (a 
metaphor for a stronger legal order). We focus on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as the 
idea around which a normative agenda is being constructed that enables the arbitrary use of 
military force as opposed to the formal procedures of a normative legal order. We highlight 
two dimensions of R2P that are contributing to the sheriff problem: 1) a selectivity in 
decisions about when to intervene that contradicts the predictability of a legal order and 2) a 
punitive dimension to intervention that, coupled with the selectivity, results in a moralism 
surrounding the discourse that does not advance justice but, in fact, creates injustice.
R2P has rarely been defended as a punitive mode of intervention by any of its 
proponents. Yet, it is our contention that in order to ensure that states uphold their 
responsibilities to their own citizens, punitive measures are sometimes necessary. Moreover, 
the few times that R2P has been invoked by the Security Council or individual states in 
justifying a military action, a discourse of punishment has appeared. When coupled with its 
selective implementation, this punitive aspect of R2P results in military actions against target 
states that produce an unjust international legal system.
This paper suggests a different approach that might better function to protect 
populations and individuals without creating the problem of the sheriff. It does so not by 
abandoning the punitive elements of intervention, but rather by more clearly articulating how 
any mode of punishment must be connected to a legal and political order in which law 
making and law enforcement are clearly defined. Our approach advocates a more explicit 
constitutional order, one in which the powers and practices of law making are separated from 
law enforcement and which includes a more purposeful law making, or legislative, function 
within which norms such as R2P can be translated into rules or even laws. In so doing, we 
circumvent the idea that making R2P a legal obligation is too difficult, for it both 
incorporates existing legal principles and also can be made a more robust legal instrument if 
it arises from a clearly defined law making structure. We explore how R2P can become a 
stronger legal principle by putting it forth as an international treaty that includes a more 
clearly separated judicial and executive function. 
In the first section, we explore the nature of punishment in international relations, 
with a special focus on punitive uses of force. We argue that while R2P is usually framed in 
terms of prevention and protection, it also includes punitive dimensions, at least in the logic 
of how it has been pursued. The next section looks at the selective nature of how R2P has 
been deployed and argues that when coupled with its punitive ethos, this selectivity makes 
R2P even more problematic. After exploring these theoretical points, we turn to the 
intervention in Libya and the non-interventions in Bahrain and Syria as evidence of both 
punishment and selectivity in the framing of R2P. We conclude the article with some 
suggestions for viable reform options. 
Punishment
Interventions are not generally described as punitive; indeed, it is rare that punishment as a 
formal legal or even political concept is employed in international affairs. But a number of 
international political practices have strong punitive dimensions. The most obvious one is 
economic sanctions, which by its very name suggests a mode of punishment.4 Others include 
counterterrorism policy5 and military reprisals.6 Military intervention, even when labelled 
humanitarian, can also be punitive especially when interventions are undertaken in response 
to harms inflicted on a population and when the intended outcome is ‘bringing perpetrators to 
justice’ and/or 'regime change' rather than simply providing humanitarian aid.7 
A punishment is the infliction of harm in response to a violation of a norm or rule.  
Punishment differs from vengeance because it is a response to the violation of a general rule 
and not a single act of harm. This distinction is important as many assume that vengeance 
differs from punishment because a non-sovereign undertakes the former while a sovereign 
undertakes the latter. For an infliction of harm to count as punishment it must be intended to 
support, in some way, a general rule of behaviour for a society. Reflecting the introductory 
metaphor, a vigilante undertakes acts of vengeance while a sheriff punishes. Sheriffs punish 
offenders, although, as will be made clear below, their decisions about who to punish and 
what kind of punishment is appropriate generates some of the problems currently facing the 
international order. 
Punitive practices do not simply enforce specific rules; they play a central role in 
creating political order. One can see this in the traditional liberal conception of a 
constitutional order in which the three parts of the political system – legislator, executive and 
judiciary – create rules and then enforce them. In this model, the legislative body makes the 
law, the judge determines if an individual had violated the law leading to the imposition of a 
sentence, and the executive carries out that sentence. Within that model, it might seem as if 
the legislator alone creates the order through the creation of rules that define it. But, the 
related judicial role of finding parties guilty and determining their sentence is also part of the 
creation of a just political order.8 The judgment of a judicial body regarding both how to 
interpret the law and the sanction applied when the law is violated plays a crucial role in the 
political order that emerges. While a judge might sentence a guilty party to 5 years in prison, 
the type of prison, the details of the incarceration and the possibility for early release will be 
dependent on the executive branch’s interpretations of what it means to punish. 
A slightly different way to see this traditional constitutional division of labour can be 
found in John Rawls work when he argued that there are two types of rules: those that justify 
a practice as a whole and those that justify a particular application of that practice.  He uses 
this distinction to make the case that punishment can be justified in both utilitarian and 
retributive ways.  The practice of punishment as a means of enforcing justice in a society – 
that is, as an institution – is utilitarian.  But the particular application of punishment in 
specific cases – the action of punishment – is best understood as retributive.  One way to see 
this distinction is through the different roles played by a legislator and a judge. The legislator 
constitutes the political through law making, with a focus on the good for the society as a 
whole. The judge, while seeing his or her role as ensuring that justice is done to this 
individual, also plays a role in constructing that larger order, although this might not be 
obvious at first.  In so doing, both look to the political community albeit, as Rawls notes, one 
toward its future and one towards its past.9 Punishment, as oriented toward violations taking 
place in the past, constructs the future of the political society.10
Punitive interventions can be classified in terms of their purpose and their target. 
Deterrent interventions are designed to inflict harm in order to change behaviour. They might 
be specific deterrent, i.e. change the behaviour of the target being punished, or general 
deterrent, i.e. change the behaviour of others who may be witnessing the punishment, either 
in that country or, often times, at the global level. Retributive interventions are designed to 
inflict harm on the violator simply because the rule was broken; that is, to achieve some level 
of justice, a harm of sorts is inflicted on the target. The target can be one of three agents: the 
individual leader, the governing regime, or the country as a whole. 
Underlying these different forms of intervention are different levels of harm, ranging 
from outright violence to trials and mass education practices in a society. In the final section, 
we make the case for the less violent means of punishment, those focused on trials in 
particular. But, this should not diminish the fact that any form of punishment requires the 
infliction of harm. We also propose punishments that focus on the first two targets, leaders 
and regimes, rather than entire countries, as it is more difficult to use force proportionally 
against an entire population.11
The following table summarizes these different types:
Purpose/target Individual leader Regime Country
Deterrent Bomb targets of value 
to leader (homes, 
support system)
Bomb targets of 
value to regime 
(institutions, party 
headquarters)




Retributive Assassination or arrest 
and prosecution in 
court setting
Lustration or arrest 






These are not simply categories of possible forms of punitive intervention; as we 
suggest below, punitive interventions of different types can be found in both the Libyan 
action and in proposals for a Syrian intervention. The categories listed above, further, should 
be seen as ‘ideal types’ for they often overlap and are proposed simultaneously. But 
distinguishing them provides both clarity on how they have been used by advocates of R2P 
and also how they might be refined if R2P is to become part of a more global constitutional 
framework. Outside of the specific forms of punitive intervention, it is also important to keep 
in mind the wider point made above; using punishment not only accomplishes certain 
objectives in terms of individuals and their violations of the rules, it also constructs a kind of 
political order through the decision to punish some agents rather than others and to use some 
particular kinds of punishments. For instance, if international society uses coercive bombing 
campaigns against whole countries rather than the arrest and prosecution of leaders and 
regime supporters, this will further normalize violence and war. We accept that punishment is 
a necessary response to rule violations but we propose ways by which punitive interventions 
can be used to sustain human rights and civilian protection in a way that creates a more just 
global order. 
R2P as a form of punishment generates a type of political order at the global level. It 
normalizes behaviours and legitimatises agents as part of the order through decisions about 
who can be justly punished, who can carry out those punishments, and the exact crimes that 
merit punishment. But, as noted in our introduction, the uses of R2P thus far have generated 
injustice due to their selective employment and their disconnection from a more clearly 
defined constitutional order. Before reviewing how such an order might be constructed so as 
to incorporate a more clearly defined R2P or some other rule that might lead to punitive 
actions, we next clarify the selective – and thus inconsistent – ways R2P has been deployed 
and why we see it as, albeit unintentionally, facilitating the construction of an unjust order. 
Selectivity
R2P is today unarguably the pre-eminent academic framework for discussing humanitarian 
intervention. It has, additionally, become an established part of the international political 
lexicon and spawned a near mini-industry of NGOs and think tanks. This ubiquity has been 
regularly cited by many of R2P's more vocal proponents in defence of its achievements.12 
Yet, achieving fame was not the aim of the International Commission on International and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) when they published The Responsibility to Protect in 2001; rather 
they hoped their report would result in, 'no more Rwanda's'.13 
Since R2P's inception there has not been another Rwanda, if "Rwanda" is taken to 
mean genocide with some 800,000 casualties. Yet, to employ a cliché, correlation does not 
imply causation. R2P's efficacy - not uniquely - cannot be determined by selective, 
correlative conjecture. Yet, it is precisely this methodology/strategy which is invariably 
employed to justify R2P's efficacy. For example, the diplomatic pressure - couched in 
language which explicitly cohered with R2P - successfully brought to bear against the 
governments in Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya, during the intra-state crises in 2004 and 2007 
respectively, is cited as evidence of R2P's achievements.14 Yet, such diplomatic appeals 
manifestly failed to influence the strategy of the Sri Lankan government in 2009 during its 
crack down on the Tamil Tigers.15 More obviously the "no more Rwanda's" claim can hardly 
be sustained in light of what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights described as 'a 
reign of terror...perpetrated by the government of Sudan'16 which occurred in Darfur from 
2003 to 2009 which claimed between 178-462,000 lives.17 Indeed, according to Kofi Annan 
Darfur demonstrated, 'we had learned nothing from Rwanda'.18 An arguably more emphatic 
example of selective, correlative conjecture was the various grandiose declarations which 
greeted the intervention in Libya in 2011; this is dealt with in detail in the subsequent section. 
Suffice to say, Ban Ki-Moon's claim that the intervention demonstrated 'the international 
community’s determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence 
perpetrated upon them by their own government'19 appeared less convincing six months later 
when he publicly criticised the international inaction in the face of the violence in Syria, a 
theme which was to appear in his speeches for the next three years. 
Even if we accept that R2P did play a causal role in those cases where it is claimed to 
have positively influenced events - the Ivory Coast in 2004, Kenya in 2007 and Libya in 2011 
- it is nonetheless clear that the record since the ICISS report was published in 2001 has been 
erratic. This, indeed, is acknowledged by some of R2P's more sober supporters; Thomas 
Weiss, indicatively, has suggested that thanks to R2P '...we can say no more Holocausts, 
Cambodias, and Rwandas – and occasionally mean it’.20 The fact that R2P works 
"occasionally" can be seen as progressive or not of course, but leaving this debate this aside, 
it is the intention here to identify the root cause of this inconsistency so as to bolster the 
argument expounded later regarding the need for legal reform. 
In 2005 two paragraphs of the World Summit Outcome Document made reference to 
R2P; in essence, they stated that individual states had certain responsibilities towards their 
own citizens and also that the international community had a concomitant responsibility to 
act if the host state was unable or unwilling to abide by this responsibility. The crimes listed 
as being within R2P's purview were genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. While this commitment was certainly laudable, it is hardly new.21 Each of 
these "four crimes" was illegal long before 2005; indeed, there is no shortage of international 
laws proscribing human rights abuses.22 Likewise, that the international community had the 
right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states to prevent and/or halt these crimes was also 
established - and indeed actualised - before 2005.23 Of course, as is well known the 
enforcement of international human rights law has been erratic; indeed it was this 
inconsistency that the ICISS explicitly sought to address. 
This inconsistency stems from the institutional structure of the UN and in particular 
the power - particularly the veto - wielded by the permanent five members of the Security 
Council (P5). The only viable legal basis for external intervention in the domestic affairs of a 
state - without the state's consent - is Chapter VII of the Charter which is dependent on the 
assent of the Security Council. Unsurprisingly then, the enforcement of international law - 
specifically the use of force for the protection of human rights - is prey to the political 
exigencies of the P5. The Security Council, it must be remembered, was established primarily 
to prevent conflict between the great powers and maintain - as per the wording of Article 24 - 
"international peace and security" rather than enforce human rights law.24 The powers vested 
in the P5 were consciously designed so as to reflect the realities of power in international 
politics and orientate the organisation towards the maintenance of order rather than the 
pursuit of justice.25 R2P has not altered in any way the institutional arrangements for 
enforcing international law or the remit of the P5, nor has it created an alternative source of 
authority to the Security Council and, therefore, law enforcement remains dependant on the 
political will and national interests of the P5s. 
The absence of legal reform is not seen, however, as problematic by many of R2P's 
advocates who argue that R2P is 'revolutionary' because it creates a framework for ostensibly 
irresistible moral advocacy.26 R2P has become, in essence, a means by which normative 
pressure is consolidated and brought to bear on those controlling the levers of power. 
Indicatively, the first aim of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect is, 
'Strengthen normative consensus for RtoP at the international, regional, sub-regional and 
national levels'.27 The key focus, therefore, is - as many acknowledge - mobilising political 
will and changing the decision-making calculus of the P5.28 
There is no doubt that, in many cases,  moral norms predate positive law and thus it is 
not in principle illogical to argue that achieving normative consensus should be the first step 
towards a more responsive international order. The problem is, however, that there is scant 
evidence that R2P is orientated in any way towards institutional reform; in fact the opposite 
appears be the case. Legal reform is rejected by many as utopian; the ostensibly more realistic 
strategy is to craft arguments that will convince states to abide by their previous 
commitments to respect human rights.29 While a case can be made that democratic states are 
somewhat receptive to moral advocacy - though this is far from assured as the invasion of 
Iraq and the non-intervention in Darfur attest30 - the willingness of China and Russia to 
accede to humanitarian appeals is surely negligible. As these states become increasingly more 
powerful, the efficacy of moral advocacy will arguably diminish.31 
Thus, at present the existing mechanisms by which human rights law is enforced and 
violators punished remains a matter of political will which is by definition transitory and 
context-specific. Thus this echoes the powers vested in the sheriff as noted in the introduction 
where the legal authority to act is not accompanied by any duty; the Security Council may 
take action but it is under no obligation to do so and thus the P5 thus merely have a 
'discretionary entitlement' to act.32 Thus, somewhat perversely, the centrality of Security 
Council authorisation in the application of R2P has in fact further consolidated the P5’s 
primacy, despite its powers actually constituting one of the original catalysts for the ICISS's 
proposal. 
Libya, Syria and Bahrain
Selective Intervention
As the previous section argued, R2P facilitates a world order in which certain agents can 
selectively increase their own power and still fail to uphold the protection of individuals. This 
deleterious selectivity has been readily apparent with in the Security Council's response to the 
Arab Uprisings particularly with respect to the situations in Libya, Bahrain and Syria. 
No-one can reasonably deny that the Security Council's response to the crisis in Libya 
was unusually swift and characterised, at least initially, by unprecedented collective unity. 
While some criticised the intervention as variously an unwarranted and disproportionate 
response33, a cynical act motivated by a desire for resources34, and a divisive threat to global 
order35, the focus here is not on the merits of the intervention itself but the means by which it 
was sanctioned and the broader context. 
If China and/or Russia had chosen to veto Resolution 1973 the intervention would not 
have occurred; evidence suggests President Obama in particular considered Security Council 
approval to be Russia a sine qua non. What then explains the Chinese and Russian 
abstentions?  The most plausible explanation relates to the position adopted by the African 
Union and especially the Arab League; neither China nor Russia wished to block an initiative 
which these regional organisations supported and thus they abstained. This indeed, was 
reflected in the Chinese statement; "We also attach great importance to the position of 
African countries and the AU. In view of this...China abstained."36 Russia also explained its 
abstention was an expression of support for the Arab League's call for action.37 Indeed, 
according to Gareth Evans the Arab League's support "was absolutely crucial in ensuring that 
there was both a majority on the Council and no exercise of the veto by Russia or China"38 
while Bellamy stated, without its support, "China and Russia would have certainly vetoed 
Resolution 1973."39 It is also clear that the US's position was greatly influenced by the 
African Union's but most particularly the Arab League’s position.40 The position of the Arab 
League - and the members of the GCC in particular - on the Arab Uprisings has been far from 
principled and the reasoning behind their support for military action against Libya points 
towards obviously geopolitical motives.41  This inconsistency was most evident when the 
GCC sent troops into Bahrain on the 14th March to help the embattled government crush the 
popular protest. What followed was described by the International Crisis Group (ICG) as a 
‘campaign of retribution’ as the foreign troops, primarily from Saudi Arabia, enabled the 
government to escalate its draconian crack-down.42 Despite this, the ICG note that Western 
states, the US in particular, criticised the violence ‘relatively mildly’ and ‘threw its weight 
behind the Crown-Prince’s efforts to jump-start a substantive reform effort’. This was a 
consequence, they note, of the US’s desire to appease the Saudi royal family who considered 
the continuation of the monarchy in Bahrain an ‘existential issue’.43 
The selectivity has been more obvious, however, with respect to the situation in Syria. 
There is no doubt it is overly simplistic to argue that the lack of military intervention in Syria 
(to date) constitutes definitive evidence that the intervention in Libya was thus motivated by 
oil, geopolitics etc. The situations are clearly different and the dynamics of Syria's 
relationship with key regional and international actors arguably militates against the kind of 
action taken against Libya. The charge of selectivity regarding Syria, however, should not 
focus only on Western states; while the US, UK and France have been denounced by many 
for failing to act as robustly as they did with respects to Libya, the position of Russia, and to 
a lesser extent China, constitute a far more obviously inconsistent approach to upholding 
human rights and abiding by R2P. Both Russia and China have three times vetoed resolutions 
on Syria yet in each case the draft resolutions were far less robust than Resolution 1973 on 
Libya. None of the draft resolutions mentioned military intervention but sought only to 
impose arguably modest economic and political punishments against Assad's regime. Indeed, 
beyond just blocking international attempts to censure Syria, Russia has continued to supply 
the regime with offensive weaponry.44 As the situation continued to deteriorate throughout 
2012, on the 3rd August the General Assembly took the unusual step of condemning the 
Security Council in a non-binding resolution which followed an emotive debate on the 
situation.45 This episode has troubling implications for R2P. Despite the various effusive 
declarations that it was a 'revolutionary' concept R2P has obviously not inhibited Russia from 
engaging in a very public display of cynical geopolitics. 
Whether in the form of the Arab League's intervention in Bahrain, the West's 
shameful silence over this intervention, or Russia's policy of protecting Syria at the UN, the 
international response to the Arab Uprisings has alleviated the suffering of certain groups 
while ignoring the plight of others. Perversely, the power and international standing of 
NATO, the Arab League and Russia have arguably grown as a result of their various actions 
during the crises; each have at certain points shaped the "international" response to the 
dominant concern of the day. Where actors have had their designs thwarted - as surely even 
the US and Russia at various times have - this has been a result of old-fashioned power 
politics rather than the influence of R2P. Thus, like the sheriff, the P5 consolidate their power 
with each enforcement action whilst remaining outside of a judicial review process. Like the 
sheriff, the P5’s actions may be legal but they are of dubious legitimacy.
Punishment
A year after the intervention in Libya Benjamin Freidman wrote:
One [reason to intervene] was to show other dictators that the international 
community would not tolerate the violent suppression of dissenters. That reverse 
domino theory has obviously failed. If Qaddafi’s fate taught neighbouring leaders 
like Bashar al-Assad anything, it is to brutally nip opposition movements in the 
bud before they coalesce, attract foreign arms and air support, and kill you—or, if 
you’re lucky, ship you off to the Hague.46
Was the intervention in Libya a punitive one? How would one evaluate this? Recalling the 
table of punitive interventions listed above, it seems evident that the intervention included 
both deterrent and retributive dimensions. Unlike others, though, this targeted primarily the 
leadership, not just Qaddafi but members of his family. 
Security Council Resolution 1973 was largely punitive; its operational clauses included 
five elements: 1) a deferral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC); 2) an arms embargo; 3) a travel ban for those within the regime; 4) the freezing of 
assets of those in the regime; and 5) the creation of a sanctions committee to monitor 
compliance with the resolution. Of these five, only one, the arms embargo, was not explicitly 
punitive. The others all targeted the regime and the leadership of Libya. The reasons for the 
resolution are many, but perhaps the one that galvanized members of the international 
community to act was the speech by Qaddafi on 22 February in which he described the rebels 
as ‘cockroaches’ and said that those resisting his regime should be hunted from house to 
house. On the same day as Qaddafi’s speech, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect issued an open letter requesting many of the items that found their way into the 
Security Council’s resolution.47 Once Resolution 1970 was passed on 26 February, the same 
group stated that while the resolution was a positive step, a military intervention was 
necessary. That intervention was justified in terms of both stopping atrocities and deferring 
future ones: “Fulfilling the responsibility to protect involves identifying the scenarios 
whereby civilians may be the victims of mass atrocities, adopting strategies to deter 
perpetrators from committing future crimes, and crucially, employing protective strategies to 
halt current attacks”.48  A subsequent statement from the same organization, again calling for 
intervention, implied more clearly a punitive logic: “Behind the firm voice of the Arab 
League and its support for more forceful action lies the conviction that the Libyan regime 
should face the consequences for its brutal actions”.49
Resolution 1973 set out the important operational clause of allowing ‘all means 
necessary’ for three objectives: 1) protect civilians; 2) create a no-fly zone; and 3) enforce the 
arms embargo. Military operations began soon after the resolution was passed and NATO 
commanders insisted that these three points were the core of their mission. But as soon 
became clear, the mission of protecting civilians means not simply stopping harms against 
them but hurting those that are doing the harming; in other words, inflicting harm for 
violating a rule, the definition of punishment noted above. In a press conference on 8 April 
2011, the deputy commander of the mission hinted at the punitive logic underling the means 
of protecting civilians:
On Wednesday, we engaged forces in central Libya including an air defence 
facility near Surt under our mission to protect civilians and civilian population 
areas. The pressure of NATO aircraft and the accuracy of our strikes continue to 
pressure those who would bring harm to innocent civilians.50
On 27 June 2011, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for three individuals 
charged with crimes against humanity: Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and 
Abdullah al-Sanussi.51 The indictment - designed to support the rebels against the Gaddafi 
regime52 - relied primarily on events that took place in February 2011 surrounding the use of 
military force against protestors. When, the ICC’s arrest warrants were issued, NATO’s 
spokesperson stated:
The arrest warrants… show exactly why that resolution was necessary; why 
NATO decided to act; and why NATO will keep up the pressure until that 
mandate is fulfilled. The arrest warrants are yet another signal from the 
international community to the Qadhafi regime. Your place is on trial; not in 
power, in Tripoli. It is not for NATO to enforce that warrant. That is for the 
appropriate authorities. Our mandate is to protect civilians from attack…this is the 
military track where NATO foreign ministers have set out three clear goals: an 
end to all attacks against civilians; the withdrawal to their barracks and bases of 
all of Qadhafi's military and paramilitary forces; and full and unimpeded 
humanitarian access…NATO is part of that broad international effort to reach a 
solution to the crisis. But we have made clear from the start that there is no purely 
military solution. It's the combination of our continued military pressure and a 
reinforced political pressure that will bring about the transition to democracy that 
the Libyan people demand and deserve.53
Note the spokesperson affirms that the arrest warrants are part of the same strategy as the 
military campaign, yet makes it clear that the military campaign is not about arresting 
individuals. The idea that the intervention and the ICC could work in parallel had been part of 
the larger intervention; as US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates stated at a press conference 
in Cairo, ‘the international community has a number of ‘hammers in its toolbox’, one of 
which is the ICC’.54
On 20 October 2011Qaddafi was executed by rebel soldiers without any trial or 
official process. Only two days later, the NATO Secretary General announced the ‘liberation 
of Libya’ and noted that the intervention would end on 31 October. While NATO had insisted 
on keeping itself separate from the ICC indictment and tried to keep its focus on protection of 
civilians rather than punishment, the fact that they ended their intervention as soon as 
Qaddafi was killed suggests that his death – or punishment of sorts – fulfilled their mission. 
At one level, the indictment of Qaddafi, his son and Sanussi reflect the legalized, 
focused punishment that we advocate in the final section of this article. On another level, 
though, the wider discourse of the intervention and the fact that the intervention ended after 
the death of Qaddafi points to the overarching punitive nature of the intervention, especially 
when coupled with ICC indictment. While the case against Qaddafi’s son and al-Sanussi 
continues, the punitive element of the intervention itself seems clear here. 
While there has not been an intervention in Syria, the arguments being made in 
support of intervention parallel the punitive logic of the Libyan intervention. The US 
government’s initial response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria called for 
accountability in language stronger than most diplomatic statements; Secretary of State John 
Kerry argued in his press conference of 26 August 2013 that “…there is accountability for the 
use of chemical weapons so that it never happens again…President Obama believes there 
must be accountability for those who would use the world's most heinous weapons against 
the world's most vulnerable people.”55 While accountability is not necessarily the same as 
punishment, the primary means of holding agents accountable in a political system is by 
punishing those who violate the rules. Further, in the case of Syria, it would appear that the 
threat of punishment may have prompted the regime to respond, as it soon decided to turn 
over its chemical weapons materials to the international community. 
In response to the call for a punitive intervention in Syria, some international legal 
scholars have emphasized the illegality of punishment or the related ideas of reprisals and 
countermeasures in the current international legal order. One analyst, echoing the analysis 
here, though taking a directly opposed position, argued that punitive intervention violates the 
primary legal structure concerning the use of force, the UN Charter. She goes on to forcefully 
contest the idea that R2P might have any punitive justification:
R2P is not a form of punishment or a rhetorical device. It does not sanction 
military retaliation against a state for attacking its own civilians, nor does it justify 
violence as a symbolic gesture for expressing solidarity with that oppressed 
population. If the United States launches “punitive,” “surgical,” or “symbolic” 
military strikes in Syria and we stop while the civilian population remains at risk, 
our responsibility to protect will be unmet. But if a US military campaign results 
in greater suffering by the civilian population we will have engaged in an 
inhumane intervention. In order to fulfil the United States’ Responsibility to 
Protect in Syria, we must commit ourselves to non-lethal and life-saving forms of 
humanitarian assistance for the Syrian people.56
A different account, also from an international legal position, argues that the current 
international legal order does not allow for the idea of state crime and so it cannot support the 
idea of punitive intervention.57 Both these accounts suggest that non-lethal modes of 
intervention would be preferred to punitive intervention. In the case of Syria, though, it is 
difficult to see what this would mean. As suggested by the fact that the regime dropped its 
chemical weapons programme in part because of the pressures placed on it by the Obama 
administration, perhaps one can conclude that the deterrent threat of punishment 
accomplished some good. 
In addition to the deterrent nature of a possible punitive intervention, there are also 
suggestions for a retributive one. In August 2011 the UN Human Rights Council established 
an Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic with a 
mandate to “establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and of 
the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view of 
ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against 
humanity, are held accountable.”58 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi 
Pillay, stated in December 2013 that the Commission’s findings made it clear that the regime 
would be held accountable and that she believed members should be tried before the ICC.59 
In January 2013, Switzerland proposed that the UN Security Council should refer the case of 
Syria to the ICC in a letter signed by both the United Kingdom and France. Philippe Sands 
argued that the proposal to try members of the regime before the ICC is a “justified 
gamble”.60 Though not interventions, these developments suggest that a wider discourse of 
retributive punishment surrounds and informs the international response to Syria. 
The Need for Reform
Many hold that R2P has increased the chances that the Security Council will act and that this 
constitutes progress when compared with bygone eras when - ostensibly - there was 
consistently no response.61 It is our contention, however, that the influence of R2P on the 
contemporary international system does not constitute an improvement; rather we see it as 
entrenching the very structural problems that have contrived to produce the poor record 
advocates of R2P sought to redress.. 
R2P emerged during a period when there was widespread calls for reform of the UN; 
NATO's unilateral intervention in Kosovo in 1999, coupled with the fallout from the wilful 
inertia in the face of the Rwandan genocide, had created a consensus, albeit heterogeneous, in 
favour of reform, particularly reform of the Security Council. Yet the ICISS did not 
substantively address the very issue that arguably impelled its formation, namely the question 
of authority.62 Rather R2P is merely a normative framework which can be used to apply 
leverage against the Security Council to convince them to take action.63 Thus, arguably the 
most concerted effort in the modern era aimed at reforming the manner in which the 
international community responds to intra-state crises, culminated in literally no alteration to 
the existing discredited legal and political system. We consider this to be untenable as any 
legal order which is constructed so as to facilitate the selective enforcement of its most 
fundamental tenets is almost by definition flawed and certainly in need of reform.
R2P’s avoidance of legal reform in favour of normative advocacy has four negative 
consequences. First, it means that R2P can be - and has been - embraced by the P5 precisely 
because it does not diminish their powers or impose any new obligations. The P5 can, 
therefore, present themselves as receptive to change and reform by pointing to their openness 
to R2P. As a result, other proposals which have advanced prescriptions for altering the 
powers and composition of the Security Council have been side-lined or simply ignored.64 
The continued focus on R2P, therefore, within academia and indeed at the UN, has 
overshadowed all other proposals. Whether consciously encouraged by the P5 or not, this 
certainly suits their interests as R2P does not greatly inhibit their policy options. 
Second, as the reaction of the "international community" to a particular crisis remains 
in essence dependant on the disposition of the Security Council, the key factor in determining 
how violations of human rights are addressed remains the political will of the P5, itself a 
product of their respective national interests. There is, therefore, what Anne Peters terms a 
‘missing link’ with respects to R2P which is precisely the gap between law and 
enforcement.65 Perpetrators of systematic human rights abuses can, even post-R2P, shield 
themselves from external censure if they have cultivated an alliance with one of the veto-
wielding P5; examples include Sudan's relationship with China, Bahrain's relationship with 
the US – via Saudi Arabia – and Syria's relationship with Russia. The emergence of R2P, 
therefore, has encouraged certain oppressive regimes to redouble their efforts to align with 
one or more of the P5. The very existence of an independent judiciary impels people to abide 
by the extant laws for fear of incurring legal censure.66 In any system where legal censure is 
not guaranteed – either because of the judiciary’s ineffectiveness, lack of coercive capacity or 
its susceptibility to corruption and/or the influence of power – potential law breakers are 
naturally less wary of breaking the law. Internationally, this is particularly apparent with 
respects to Assad’s behaviour; while the regime must have known their actions were 
manifestly illegal, this was ameliorated by their expectation that Russia would shield them 
from censure. Thus, by not addressing the enforcement gap in international law, R2P has 
facilitated the perpetuation of a system which drives rogue regimes to cultivate alliances with 
powerful states thereby further empowering these states who have yet further incentive for 
perpetuating the flawed system. 
The third adverse consequence is that the UN and indeed the ICC continue to stand 
accused of impotence or hypocrisy or both. In the course of the crisis in Syria various 
commentators have derided the UN for its failure to act and the ICC for its inability to engage 
with a regime perpetrating the very crimes it was established to prosecute.67 The UN and the 
ICC's capacity to act, however, has been severely hamstrung by their respective constitutional 
competencies which inhibit their capacity for independent action; indicatively, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights published a report in late 2013 detailing the atrocities 
committed by the Assad regime, suggesting that they amounted to war crimes which could 
come under the purview of the ICC. Yet, the next stage – enforcement/punishment – was 
corrupted by virtue of the fact that it was a matter for the P5 to determine how to respond.68 
Additionally, when either organisation has acted they have been criticised for engaging in 
hypocritical realpolitik, and both have been presented as handmaidens to power.  While the 
UN and the ICC are both imperfect institutions, erosion of support for these primary bastions 
of international law, multilateralism and universal jurisprudence undoubtedly constitutes a 
set-back for those who support the evolution of a world order which places a primary 
emphasis on the protection of individual human rights. 
The fourth and final deleterious consequence of perpetuating the status quo is that 
unilateral intervention remains a strong possibility. The crisis in Syria - specifically the 
deadlock at the UN - unsurprisingly led to renewed calls for unilateral action against the 
Assad regime. For many, Assad's use of chemical weapons in August 2013 constituted the 
point at which inaction was no longer acceptable, regardless of whether the Security Council 
supported military action or not. Indeed, one of us has made an explicitly punitive argument 
for intervention in Syria after evidence emerged that the Syrian regime had used chemical 
weapons against its own people.69  In our view, pragmatically, until the system is reformed it 
is occasionally necessary for ‘sheriffs’ to intervene in order to end the loss of human life. 
Crucially, however, we feel that this is an untenable situation which cannot constitute a viable 
basis upon which to establish a legal order responsive to human rights violations. 
Unilateralism by definition threatens inclusivity, general law abidance and is a threat to any 
multi-lateral order. The history of unilateral action testifies to its grave impact on 
international peace and security - the bedrock of any human rights regime - and indeed recent 
examples, such as the use of force by the US against Iraq in 2003 and Russia against Georgia 
in 2008, are contemporary reminders of this. Unilateral intervention may of course be 
morally legitimate but given the difficulties inherent in regulating such action, there is no 
guarantee that it always will be.70 Nor, crucially, does such action do much to address the 
prevalence of what Simon Chesterman describes as "in-humanitarian non-intervention", that 
is those cases where in the absence of political will and national interests, humanitarian crises 
go unaddressed.71  
R2P’s unintended consequences contrast sharply with the general principles of a 
functioning legal order as discussed in this paper’s first section. A fundamental principle 
underpinning any legal order is the removal of selectivity from law enforcement and to that 
end the constitutional separation of the judiciary from the executive lest we have the sheriff-
like scenario whereby the three different functions of law in a political order - legislation, 
judgment and enforcement - are conflated in one person. At present – even post R2P – the 
international legal system comprises just such a constitutional conflation; the Security 
Council thus operates as a ‘political core in a legal regime’.72
That the international and domestic are very different legal orders is axiomatic; that 
they should - and will always - be so is fatalistic and, in essence, unhelpful. There have been 
myriad proposals advanced which advocate reform of the international legal system73 – and 
the powers of the Security Council in particular – all of which essentially cohere with Hans 
Kelsen’s conception of the current system as ‘primitive’ and but a stage in an evolutionary 
process’.74 Our contribution is not to provide a detailed proposal but rather to argue, on the 
basis of the fate of R2P and the reaction to the Arab Uprisings, that those concerned with 
human rights protection must accept that any proposals which seek to redress the appalling 
record of international responses to intra-state crises will fail if they do not aim to reform the 
current legal system. 
 The problem is certainly not the absence of laws proscribing human rights violations; 
suffice to say there are few areas not covered by international law.75 Nor is there necessarily a 
problem with the manner in which laws are created; the General Assembly has powers 
analogous to that of the legislature in domestic orders and as it constitutes a representative 
body – albeit state-based – it is a body which can boast significant representative 
legitimacy.76  The General Assembly is not a legislative body in the formal sense of the word; 
international law comes about primarily through treaties. At the same time, the General 
Assembly has a crucial role to play in the advancement and codification of international law. 
One means by which the institution can play this role is by officially adopting the 
International Law Commission’s various draft articles into more substantive international 
legal codes; this took place with the Articles on State Responsibility which the General 
Assembly adopted in various votes. Importantly these votes did not turn the Articles into an 
international law, which only a treaty can formally do; rather, they expressed, on three 
different votes, the sense of the international community in support of these rules.77 The 
General Assembly’s adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005 is another 
instance of this role. One reform proposal would be to propose that the General Assembly be 
given greater competence to actually codify international law. This could, in fact, come about 
through the simple task of having the General Assembly pass a resolution that directly and 
clearly affirms the centrality of R2P and perhaps even lays out possible punitive responses to 
violations of a state’s responsibility. While the international community could, of course, 
ignore such a resolution, it might prompt some movement forward on this agenda. 
The Security Council does not have the power to create laws and as such the 
institutional configuration with respects to the process by which laws are generated is not 
necessarily corrupted by hegemonic influence, although there is discussion among 
international legal scholars about an emerging legislative capacity for the Security Council. 
In our view, this development is worrying, for its law making capacity would both violate the 
principle of a separation of powers and would also allow powerful agents to override the 
interests of a wider international community. So, in this case, we would argue that the 
Security Council should continue primarily as an executive body rather than a quasi-
legislative one.78 
Nor is there a problem with respects to either the principle of international censure or 
a lack of an international judicial body. In terms of the former, it is now universally 
established and recognised that the international community can, in certain circumstances, 
exercise jurisdiction over intra-state affairs and hold individuals – including state leaders – to 
account. In terms of the latter the International Court of Justice has been in existence for 
seventy years while, perhaps more importantly, the ICC was established specifically to deal 
with human rights violators. 
The issue is therefore the process by which human rights laws are upheld and 
violators punished. In this sense, we agree with those, such as Cherif Bassouni, who appeals 
for reforms which would involve ‘…international legal processes that are similar to national 
legal processes, but which also apdply to state action’.79 The problem can thus be located 
almost exclusively at the point of enforcement and thus reforming the existing system need 
not require a complete transformation of the present legal order. The starting point would be 
to build on the provisions related to R2P in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and 
the vast corpus of human rights law and consolidate these into a legally binding treaty which 
reiterates the proscription against various forms of human rights abuses and, crucially, 
outlines both the point at which these abuses are to be considered so severe as to warrant 
external involvement of some kind – though not necessarily military intervention – and the 
manner in which this decision would be taken, by whom and through which legal processes. 
These processes would, by definition, necessitate a diminution in the power of the Security 
Council in favour of a demonstrably independent and accountable judicial body with the 
power to determine both that a violation of the law has occurred and the nature of the 
resultant punishment. The nature of the punishment, would of course, potentially vary, as is 
the case with respects to judicial decisions domestically where, as noted earlier, judges have a 
degree of discretion. This would, therefore, allow for judicial decisions which reflect the 
reality that in certain contexts particular types of punitive action – most obviously military 
intervention – would potentially do more harm than good. Perhaps coupled with a stronger 
role for the General Assembly in laying out a range of punitive measures in a resolution, 
along with some discretion allowed to the Security Council in choosing possible punitive 
responses, some form of institutional cooperation could yield a stronger set of punitive 
responses to violations of state’s responsibilities to protect their citizens. Through the 
imposition of alternative measures – including sanctions, suspension of UN membership, 
travel bans and ICC referrals – violators would incur punishment of some form. Additionally, 
and crucially, the very availability of these punitive sanctions, would serve as a deterrent. 
This judicial body could also, we contend, come into being without necessitating the 
dissolution of the Security Council; conceivably it could be triggered into action in situations 
where the Security Council is demonstrably deadlocked despite consensus in the General 
Assembly in favour of punitive action. This was very obviously the case with respects to 
Syria as reflected in the General Assembly’s condemnation of the Security Council’s inability 
to unite behind punitive action. The new body would, therefore, challenge what Buchanan 
and Keohane describe as the Security Council’s ‘unconditional exclusive legitimacy’ rather 
than its legitimacy per se.80 
The goal avowed here can of course be criticized as utopian. This is not an 
unreasonable charge; in 2012 the so-called “Small 5” - Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, 
Singapore and Switzerland - had their modest proposal for reforming the Security Council 
unceremoniously discarded, so naturally the prospects of our reforms being implemented  are, 
we accept, relatively negligible.81 That said, we offer the following rejoinders; first, the 
primary aim here is to demonstrate that the existing system – even post R2P and the 
establishment of the ICC – remains fundamentally corrupted by the constitutional 
competencies of its institutions, specifically the P5. Achieving agreement around this finding 
would constitute progress as it would hopefully impel those concerned about human rights to 
desist from engaging with strategies which, we feel, are doomed to fail and instead work on 
determining how the reforms we advance in general terms might be implemented in practice. 
Additionally, the temper of the international community is demonstrably in favour of reform; 
the Security Council is widely acknowledged as lacking legitimacy in terms of its 
membership and competencies as reflected in the statements from the General Assembly, the 
UN Secretary-General and the general trend amount commentators and academics. Our call 
for reform is not, therefore, an aberration, but rather reflective of the majority view. Clearly 
the fact that the P5 have evidently no interest in diminishing their own powers constitutes a 
major barrier to reform but it need not be seen as insurmountable; the ICC was established 
despite the opposition of the US, Russia and China and thus, major changes to the 
architecture of international law can occur absent P5 support.  The international system is, 
famously, very different to the domestic legal system and thus the institutional configuration 
and theoretical foundations – normative and real – of domestic legal orders naturally do not 
equate with that which exists internationally; yet to assert this as a counter to those, like us, 
who advocate legal reform is somewhat paradoxical as it suggests that the normative 
systemic configuration cannot be achieved because it does not presently exist. We are 
certainly not alone in suggesting alternative means of improving the international response to 
intra-state crises and the commission of mass atrocities; as Susan Meyer argued, ‘...without 
major changes in the UN, R2P will go the way of the Genocide Convention’.82  
Finally, there is the simple fact that historically, institutions – national and 
international – do not survive if their constitutions become a source of collective derision 
amongst their subjects even if a powerful elite benefit. 
Conclusion
In light of the unedifying spectacle of great power mendacity during the Arab Uprisings  – 
most notably with respects to Russia’s shielding of Syria – many have lamented the pre-
eminence of a legal system which is both utterly flawed and irrevocably embedded, and 
consequently mourned the death of R2P, which, they argue, was the most viable alternative to 
cynical realpolitik. Indicatively Jonathan Freedland wrote, ‘today [is] a good time to be a 
dictator, a butcher or the torturing head of a brutal regime. The world will let you carry on 
killing – even when it knows exactly what is happening’.83 Indeed, it surely cannot be 
acceptable that the UN High Commissioner for Human rights would publish a report 
detailing the brutal criminality of the Assad regime only for this to be rendered impotent 
because Russia has a strategic interest in protecting its ally. Likewise, a more recent report by 
a UN panel detailing the systematic oppression of North Korean’s by their illegitimate, 
murderous government floundered in the face of a Chinese veto – actual or apprehended – 
which shields the regime from censure at either the UN or the ICC.84 
R2P’s recognition of the exclusive authority of the Security Council and lack of any 
reform agenda means we are left with the status quo which has, in effect, increased the power 
of the P5. The selectivity with which the principle is deployed – and not only in the form of 
military intervention – has been obvious, and constitutes a crucial failure.85 The Arab 
Uprisings testify to the pernicious influence of the perennial flaws in the existing 
international legal order which the concept has demonstrably failed to ameliorate. It is 
difficult to see how the present system can do anything but fail to respond consistently to 
human rights violations; this manifest failing naturally leads to a legitimacy crisis – for both 
the UN and the ICC – and thus the need to initiate reform is an existential issue. As Kelsen 
noted with respects to the need for international judicial decision-making,
The objective examination and unbiased decision of the question of whether or not the 
law has been violated is the most important, the essential stage in any legal procedure. 
As long as it is not possible to remove from the interested states the prerogative to 
answer the question of law and transfer it once and for all to an impartial authority, 
namely, an international court, any further progress on the way to the pacification of 
the world is absolutely excluded.86
As R2P has increased awareness of human rights and championed the legitimacy of external 
intervention - albeit not always military – it has impelled a jarring juxtaposition between an 
elevation in the focus on human rights and negligible concomitant reforms to facilitate their 
protection and realisation. We argue that if punishment is to be a central part of the 
international legal regime, then sanctions, interventions and ICC referrals/indictments must 
take place within the context of a more explicit constitutional order which – in accordance 
with the basic theory of constitutionalism - privileges three principles: the rule of law, the 
separation of powers and constituent power. We acknowledge that these are somewhat 
utopian goals; yet, our proposal is not one that sits completely outside existing international 
legal or political institutions. As such, we see our proposal as a form of chastened utopian 
global politics, one that can be achieved through negotiation over the medium term. 
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